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In his first year in office, President Donald Trump has taken several controversial actions in the area of environmental law. Several of these, such as U.S. termination of the Paris Accords on climate change and the withdrawal of regulations on power generation, have relied on claims of presidential power. Another controversial environmental law question, and the subject of this essay, is whether Presidents can reverse or narrow the designation of landmarks as national monuments.
President Trump has ordered the administration to reconsider past monument designations for purposes of reversing the decisions of pasts presidents or narrowing their scope. On June 10, 2017, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke's issued an interim recommendation to significantly reduce the size of Bears Ears National Monument in Utah, which President Barack Obama designated shortly before leaving office. 1 Other national monuments may follow. This Essay supports the legal authority of the executive branch to undertake such action. 2 The Antiquities Act of 1906 grants the president the power to designate national monuments in order to protect historic landmarks and structures. Pursuant to this power, a president has the corresponding power to revoke prior national monument designations. Although there is no controlling judicial authority on this question, the text of the act and historical practice confirm that the Chief Executive can reduce the size of prior designations that cover vast areas of land and ocean habitat, though his power of reduction may in some instances be related to his implicit power of revocation.
Many scholars, however, take a different view. In a recent essay, for example, prominent U.S. environmental law scholars argued that a President cannot reverse or narrow the designation of an earlier national monument. 3 More than 120 law professors recently signed a letter making the same argument. 4 Their work places central reliance on a 1938 opinion by U.S. Attorney General Homer Cummings, which concluded that the statutory power granted to the president to create national monuments does not include the power of revocation. The opinion has been cited a few times in government documents, including by the solicitor of the Interior Department in 1947 (although for a different proposition) and in legal commentary, but the courts have never relied on it. We think this opinion (and the subsequent work which has relied upon it) is poorly reasoned; misconstrued a prior opinion, which came to the opposite result; and is inconsistent with constitutional, statutory, and case law governing the president's exercise of analogous grants of power.
Our analysis explains why a general discretionary revocation power must exist. Apart from a power to revoke monuments that were lawfully designated, the president has the constitutional power to declare invalid prior monuments if they were illegal from their inception. In the first instance, there is no reason why a president should give effect to an illegal act of his predecessor pending a judicial ruling. Beyond this, the president may also have a limited power to revoke monument designations based on earlier factual error or changed circumstances, even if he does not possess a general discretionary revocation power.
Almost all commentators concede that some boundary adjustments can be made to monument designations, and many have been made over the years. In 2005, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that such adjustments can be made. The only serious question is over their scope. No court has ruled on this question. Some commenters claim this is because no president has attempted to significantly reduce the size of an existing monument, but that is simply inaccurate. In the act's early years alone, some monuments were reduced by half or more.
Regardless of past practice, arguments that limit the president's authority to significantly reduce prior designations are largely conclusory-and based on the erroneous premise that the president lacks authority to revoke monuments-or driven by a selective reading of the act's purpose rather than its text. We believe a president's discretion to change monument boundaries is broad, but even if that is not so, his power to significantly change monument boundaries is at its height if the original designation was unreasonably large under the facts as they existed then or based on changed circumstances.
Part I of this Essay describes the factual, legal, and historical background to the current controversy over national monuments and the scope of the Antiquities Act. We also critique the views of scholars who believe only Congress can overturn the designation of a national monument. Part II sets out the affirmative case for a presidential power to reverse previous designations of national monuments under the Antiquities Act. We argue that under traditional principles of constitutional, legislative, and administrative law, the authority to execute a discretionary power includes the authority to reverse it. No President (nor any Congress or Supreme Court) can permanently bind his or her successors in their exercise of the executive power. Part III explains that even if one were to disagree with Part II's broad argument, the Antiquities Act by its own terms contains an ongoing authority to reverse a monument designation. Part IV shows that even if the President does not enjoy a constitutional or statutory power to repeal a monument, he or she still has the delegated authority to reduce and alter the size of a monument to ensure that it is the smallest size necessary. Rather than broadly declaring millions of acres off limits, Presidents can make their national monuments enduring by seeking a more consensual process involving Congress, state officials, and local stakeholders.
I. The Controversy over National Monuments and the Antiquities Act
As he left the Oval Office, President Obama tried to exempt his environmental policies from the effects of the November 2016 elections. Five days before Christmas, the White House announced the withdrawal of millions of acres of Atlantic and Arctic territory from petroleum development. Obama continued his midnight orders by proclaiming 1.35 million acres in Utah and 300,000 acres in Nevada to be new national monuments. White House officials claimed that both types of actions were "permanent" because there was no express authority to reverse them. But that gets the constitutional principles and legal presumptions exactly backwards. All the expresident will prove is the fleeting nature of executive power.
These actions, like many others taken by the Obama administration, will remain vulnerable to reversal by President Donald Trump. In our constitutional system, no policy can long endure without the cooperation of both the executive and legislative branches. Under Article I of the Constitution, only Congress can enact domestic statutes with any degree of permanence. And because of the Constitution's separation of powers, no policy will survive for long without securing and retaining a consensus well beyond a simple majority. Our nation's most enduring policies-antitrust, Social Security, and civil rights-emerged as the product of compromise and deliberation between the political parties. President Obama's refusal to compromise with his political opponents will guarantee that his achievements will have all the lasting significance of Shelley's King Ozymandias. 5 His inability to win much bipartisan support for his policies renders them more susceptible to repeal measures. But his unilateral actions based on his "pen and phone" have become especially vulnerable. The coming fight over public lands shows, in microcosm, the constitutional dynamics that can render presidential power in the domestic sphere so hollow.
A. Historical and Legal Background of the Antiquities Act
In 1872, Yellowstone National Park was designated the United States' first national park, withdrawing two million acres of federal land for preservation and public enjoyment. 6 Since the 1890s, however, Congress and the Executive frequently argued about the proper authority to withdraw other federal lands from general use. Different laws were used to create or authorize national forests and other national preservation designations. It wasn't until 1916 that Congress created the Act to Establish the National Park Service to help manage and regularize the creation of national parks, but even now, each national park must be created by an Act of Congress.
Almost one quarter of the units that comprise the National Park System can trace their origins to the Antiquities Act of 1906, 7 but the creation of large scenic "parks" was not the Antiquities Act's purpose and is a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Act. The original motive for the Antiquities Act was to protect ancient and prehistoric American Indian archeological sites on federal lands in the southwest from looting. The Antiquities Act was passed during the same month (June 1906) as the act creating Mesa Verde National Park, and the problems that arose in protecting the Mesa Verde ruins inform the Antiquities Act's central focus. 5 Percy Shelley's 1818 poem "Ozymandias" is about the ruins of an ancient kingdom, whose stern but long-dead ruler declared it would last forever and make men tremble in despair. All that remains in modern times is a wrecked statue of the king, his boastful claim on its pedestal, and sand all around. For the text and history of the poem, see Economist, "The Real Ozymandias: King of Kings," December 18, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/christmas-specials/21591740-enthusiasms-rivalries-fads-and-fashions-lie-behindshelleys-best-known. Poetry and rulers vainly asserting the permanence of their works, however, are more timeless. 6 "National Park System Timeline," National Park Service History, (National Park Service), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/hisnps/npshistory/timeline_annotated.htm. 7 "National Park System Timeline," supra note 2. 8 It is relevant to later arguments over the scope of the Antiquities Act that Congress enacted a statutorily fixed Mesa Verde National Park by separate statute-and did not leave that to the Executive to do so. Among other things, this is further evidence that Congress considered the authority in the Antiquities Act to protect archeological sites from In a report to the secretary of the interior, Smithsonian Institution archeologist Jesse Walter Fewkes described vandalism at Mesa Verde's Cliff Palace:
Parties of "curio seekers" camped on the ruin for several winters, and it is reported that many hundred specimens there have been carried down the mesa and sold to private individuals. Some of these objects are now in museums, but many are forever lost to science. In order to secure this valuable archaeological material, walls were broken down . . . often simply to let light into the darker rooms; floors were invariably opened and buried kivas mutilated. To facilitate this work and get rid of the dust, great openings were broken through the five walls which form the front of the ruin. Beams were used for firewood to so great an extent that not a single roof now remains. This work of destruction, added to that resulting from erosion due to rain, left Cliff Palace in a sad condition. 9 The legislative history of the Antiquities Act on the Department of Interior website provides additional historical detail, 10 but the act's text confirms that its primary purpose was to "preserve the works of man."
11 Section 1 of the original act made it a crime to "appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric object of antiquity" on federal land without permission. Section 3 provided for permits for the examination of "ruins, the excavation of archeological sites, and the gathering of object of antiquity upon" federal land. Section 4 provided the authority to the relevant department secretaries who managed federal land to issue uniform regulations to carry out the act's provisions. Section 2, which allows for the designation of national monuments and the reservation of such federal land as is necessary to protect the objects at issue, also focuses primarily on "historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest" (emphasis added).
The addition of only two words, "historic landmarks," in that sequence in Section 2 (see below) denotes something broader than preserving human artifacts. In prior proposals to protect antiquities, the Department of Interior had sought authority for scenic monuments and additional national parks, but Congress repeatedly rejected that authority. 12 Congress was annoyed by large forest designations and guarded its authority over western lands jealously.
13
As discussed above, Section 2 of the Antiquities Act not only allows protection for small areas around human archeological sites but also authorizes the president: in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national looting as distinct from creating a national park from lands that surround such archeological sites or historical landmarks. 9 U.S. (June 8, 1906) , now codified at 54 U.S.C. § § 320301-03. 12 See Lee, "The Antiquities Act, 1900-1906," discussing Congress' refusal in the period before the Antiquities Act to pass five bills that sought to grant the secretary of the interior broad authority for designating national parks. 13 Ibid. ("The reluctance of the members of the Public Lands Committee, most of them western public lands states, to grant general authority to the Executive Branch to create new national parks is understandable in the light of their past experience with the timber reservations act of 1891.") monuments, and may reserve as part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and maintenance of the objects to be protected.
There are three steps to reserving and protecting land under the Antiquities Act. First, the monument must be declared for a protective purpose upon lands owned or controlled by the United States. Second, a reservation of certain parcels of land that constitute a "part thereof" may be made, but such parcels of land may not exceed what is necessary to protect the "objects" at issue. Third, the president may specify certain restrictions or other protections that apply to the reserved land, or the relevant department secretary who has responsibility to manage the monument may issue regulations consistent with such protections.
14 Although the act's final language covered more than antiquities, and there is evidence that small scenic landmarks were contemplated, the statute's title, drafting history, and historical context is still valuable to presidents who want to follow the text and spirit of the original law. For example, earlier and contemporaneous bills for the same purpose limited monument designation to 320 or 640 acres. 15 The final bill replaced that with the (now seemingly open-ended) requirement that such monuments "shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected," but that was added to provide flexibility for special situations and not to allow a million-acre designation. Such background also helps illuminate earlier presidential abuses, whether such abuses rise to the level of a statutory violation or are just garden-variety political acts that offend individual due process rights and separation of powers principles.
Besides Mesa Verde National Park, only a handful of other national parks existed in 1906. That is one reason why Congress did not need to create the National Park Service to manage them until 1916. The Grand Canyon, for example, was not a national park in 1906 and was open to mining claims and other federal program leases.
President Theodore Roosevelt initially used his new Antiquities Act authority to protect some relatively small landmarks (e.g., Devils Tower) and Native American ruins (e.g., El Morro and Montezuma Castle), but his abuses were not long in coming. In 1908, he proclaimed the Grand Canyon National Monument, reserving more than 808,000 acres for its protection. Although later Congresses converted some national monuments covering large geological formations into national parks, including the Grand Canyon National Park in 1919, the Congress that enacted the Antiquities Act did not intend monuments of that size to be established by presidential designation.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in 1920 relied on the validity of the 1908 reservation that created the Grand Canyon National Monument in rejecting a private mining claim in Cameron v. United States. 16 There is no indication that the size of the original monument designation was at issue, perhaps because Congress had recently converted the monument into a national park by statute. Yet the Supreme Court also has considered issues relating to two other large monuments or former monuments. 17 While the original monuments' sizes were not challenged in any of these cases, it is not clear whether the courts will invalidate large geological monument designations due to their size alone.
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Even so, the Antiquities Act's primary motivation and historical context is still legally relevant to refute the arguments of those who would limit a president's revocation power based on a selective and misleading statement about its purpose. Moreover, other interpretive questions remain open, such as the meaning of the textual requirement that the lands being reserved under the monument designations are "owned or controlled" by the United States.
Three of the most important Indian lands where prehistoric artifacts might be looted were not even states in 1906; Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma were then federal territories. Hawaii was only recently annexed and organized as a territory, and Alaska was still a sparsely settled American "district" after the gold rushes of the 1890s-not yet an official federal territory. These were areas of exclusive federal ownership and control.
Other areas of the West that included early national monument designations were owned by the national government, so an issue of control short of ownership was not at play in any of those designations. That may be relevant to the type of control Congress intended as a predicate to the exercise of authority under the Antiquities Act.
B. Previous Scholarly Opinion
Most of the literature on presidential uses of the Antiquities Act responded to the Clinton Administration's monument designations. Recent work has also emerged in response to an earlier version of this paper released by the American Enterprise Institute, 19 and to President Trump's subsequent executive orders in late April to the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to review and make recommendations on whether to alter the largest and most controversial 16 Sequoia National Monument as not constituting "the smallest areas compatible with proper care and management" of the objects being protected). Although the Supreme Court has not ruled expressly on a challenge to the excessive size of a monument, the courts have deferred to many presidential determinations under the act, and challengers may have to how an abuse of discretion to prevail on a size-based claim. See discussion of judicial review at page 16. Nevertheless, Tulare County may be distinguishable in future challenges since the court held that the challengers failed to establish a factual basis for their claim, not that such a claim was barred. Consider one justification President Obama provided for creating the recent Bears Ears National Monument, which Utah officials have already said they will challenge: that it contains several ancient archeological sites. Although the proclamation also cited the area's cultural, geological, and historical significance, it is unclear how isolated archeological sites are better protected after a massive 1.35 million acre monument designation that incorporates all of them than before the designation, especially when the same two federal agencies (the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management) will each manage the same areas after the designation as before it. 19 John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, "Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations," Am. Enter. Inst. (March 2017), https://perma.cc/PX7W-UD3E monument designations from the last 21 and 10 years, respectively (the later period for marine monuments).
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President Clinton used the Antiquities Act a number of times to withdraw vast expanses of federal land and territory on the high seas, and in doing so, revived a longstanding debate over whether the Antiquities Act is a legal and proper mechanism for public land management. Much of the legal literature analyzes these designations to draw broader conclusions about the Act and the reach of executive power. President Obama's use of the Antiquities Act for similar purposes (including in his last few weeks in office) broke Clinton's previous records in the number and size of controversial monument designations, and renewed concerns over the Act's use.
Much legal scholarship defends such broad interpretation of the Antiquities Act because that enables environmental preservation without the delay and compromise of politics. 21 Scholars dismiss criticism that the Act is meant only to protect manmade landscapes; 22 they argue that, in fact, the purpose of the Act is to provide an efficient, immediate mechanism for environmental preservation of both manmade and natural sites.
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They premise legal justification of aggressive presidential use of the Antiquities Act on the protective purpose of the Act, its broad language, and the perceived acquiescence of the other branches to the expansion of presidential power. 24 According to Christina Klein, the "seeds of preservationism" sit in the plain language of the Act, both in the breadth of the landscapes it purports to protect and in the expansive grant of power that it bestows upon the president. 25 This language evidences that Congress recognized the necessity of a strong executive to protect historic and natural sites alike. 26 Klein and others also claim that the failure of the other two branches to constrain the president's power under the Act implies their tacit acceptance. 27 The courts have consistently construed the president's discretion under the Act broadly, and Congress has failed to amend the Act, except as it applies to Wyoming and Alaska, despite aggressive executive implementation. 28 Indeed, it seems that courts have generally deferred to the president in interpreting the extent of his power to withdraw public lands from use. Robert Iraolo compiled and analyzed the case law interpreting the grant of discretion under the Act and found that courts have never found a monument designation to be inconsistent with the statute's language. 29 Kelly Fanizzo argues that the courts' broad statutory construction is also prudential. Presidents are best positioned to best determine the area of land for withdrawal and its best management. Moreover, they are much better able to effect a unified policy than a politically deadlocked Congress. 30 These scholars conclude that such deference is consistent with separation of powers principles because the question of land designation is a political one that should be left to a power struggle between Congress and the president, rather than to judicial review. 31 Fanizzo goes even farther, arguing that courts have an affirmative responsibility to enforce presidential directives on monuments across future administrations and thus should hear private lawsuits to compel their enforcement.
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Other scholars acknowledge that there is room for debate about whether expansive designations by presidents actually comport with the language and purposes of the Antiquities Act. For example, Scott Nishimoto analyzed President Clinton's 1.1 million acre designation of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument using different approaches to statutory interpretation to show how different legal lenses might lead to different conclusions. 33 Under a textualist approach, he predicts that existing precedent interpreting the "ordinary meaning" of the Act's language, which finds broad discretion in preservation, would likely support deference to the president's judgment the land necessary for protection of a monument. 34 On the other hand, under an originalist approach, the Parashant designation likely exceeded the "smallest area compatible" requirement because Congress "believed that the Act was going to protect only small geographical areas of land." 35 Finally, under a "dynamic" approach, which recalibrates the values of a statute according to unforeseen social, technological, and legal developments, he concludes that the designation is questionable because there are legitimate and sharply contrasting values at stake. 36 Another group of scholars has scrutinized the lack of procedural requirements that the Antiquities Act imposes on the president in making designations, particularly focusing on its failure to require the input of interested parties and local communities who will be affected by monument withdrawals. Scholars have ultimately split on whether the Antiquities Act would be improved by increasing the amount of process required by statute. 28 Klein, supra note, at 1336. 29 Iraolo, supra note_, at 185-86. 30 Fanizzo, supra note _, at 819. 31 Iraolo, supra note _, at 188-89. On one side of the debate is scholar James Rasband, who argues that the Antiquities Act should be amended to "require public participation in the withdrawal process and mandate explicit consideration of impact on local communities."
37 Rasband concedes the allure of using the Antiquities Act to avoid the political hassle of trying to get a land protection bill through Congress. 38 However, he also admits to being "troubled" by "defending an act whose primary value is as a tool to circumvent Congress" and to avoid resistance by local interests. 39 In order to make Antiquities Act designations more democratically legitimate, he recommends either an amendment to require public process or an "ethical code" to guide the withdrawal process in a way that respects the rights and voices of those affected. 40 Other scholars disagree that public participation is necessary or desirable to the execution of monument designations. Squillace argues that "the lack of process and public participation are virtues of the act that make it effective." 41 In his view, public participation would be captured by private interests and political ideology and thus would not be helpful to the president in determining whether particular land should be withdrawn. 42 More broadly stated, Squillace's position is that "public participation should not be allowed, or at least should be carefully regulated, when it has the potential to undermine the common good by interfering with the Government's capacity to make decisions that are designed to promote the public interest." 43 Albert Lin agrees that the Act is sufficiently democratic despite the lack of statutorily prescribed process. 44 He argues that voters can hold the president accountable at the ballot box if they are sufficiently outraged at his use of the Antiquities Act power. 45 Second, he argues that Congress has sufficient mechanisms to check the president because it may withhold funding for a monument's administration or can reverse the designation consistent with its ultimate authority over public lands. 46 Finally, as a matter of public policy, he argues that unilateral executive authority is preferable in the environmental context. 47 He has maintained that the president is highly accountable, he is "less subject to pressures from local [or private] interests," and he can make withdrawals quickly and decisively when necessary. 48 Thus, any information-gathering benefits of public comment are limited and counterproductive. 49 Antiquities Act scholars, however, are divided on the question of whether a president may revoke a monument designated by his predecessor. One group is comprised of those that believe that later revocation is prohibited, and a second is made up of those who consider the question 37 still open. Prior to 2017, Iraolo, Klein, Squillace, and Rasband all concluded that presidents may not revoke an existing monument, provided it was legally designated, a conclusion shared by Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht. 50 They acknowledge that the question has not been directly addressed by the courts, but nonetheless offer several arguments in favor of this conclusion. Some rely on the 1938 Attorney General opinion as dispositive. 51 Klein additionally argues that there is a qualitative difference between executive orders involving "minor policy initiatives," which are subject to reversal, and major declarations like Antiquities Act monuments, for which a reviewing court would hesitate to "countenance the casual reversal."
52 She cites INS v. Chadha for support for the general proposition "that when the executive branch acts pursuant to a lawful delegation of authority, such action can be revoked only by an act of Congress."
53 Rasband agrees that no such reversal power could be implied merely from a delegation of authority to withdraw.
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Squillace and his co-authors in the Virginia Law Review raise some additional arguments, some of which have been briefly discussed elsewhere. It argues that, in contrast to earlier scholarship that the Antiquities Act should be broadly construed, that the Act grants only "narrow" authority to designate national monuments but not revoke or reduce them. 55 The authors argue that the Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Administration Act grant express authority to revoke withdrawals, and that this implies Congress withheld revocation authority in the Antiquities Act. 56 It also argues that in 1976, Congress clarified that only it can revoke or downsize a national monument in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 57 Others, however, remain less convinced about how a reviewing court would rule. Fanizzo, Nishimoto, and Ranchod all treat the question as open. Fanizzo notes that presidential orders are generally repealable on the president's initiative without procedural requirements, 58 though she acknowledges authority that purports to treat monument designations differently. 59 Nishimoto and Ranchod note the uncertainty without making a legal conclusion.
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II. A General Discretionary Power to Revoke Prior Designations
This Part explains why Presidents have a general power to reverse the designation of landmarks as national landmarks by their predecessors. It first addresses the main authority for the proposition that such designations are permanent: the 1938 Justice Department opinion of Attorney General Cummings. We believe that Cummings reached the wrong outcome because of serious errors of interpretation and legal context. It then sets out the general principle of constitutional and administrative law that the executive branch, and, indeed, the other branches 50 Squillace, et al., supra note ,. 51 See Squillace, supra note _, at 552-56; Klein, supra note _, at 1387-89; SBBH Research Paper, supra note __ at 58-59. 52 56 Id. at 58. We respond to these arguments, infra at __. 57 Id. at 59-64. We respond to this argument, infra at __. 58 Fanizzo, supra note _, at 808, n. 270. 59 Id. at 822. 60 Nishimoto,supra note _, at 93; Ranchod, supra note _, at 554. of government, can undo their past decisions by following the same legal process. Finally, it explains that in the delegation of its constitutional power over public lands, Congress could have introduced a one-way ratchet into the Antiquities Act. But it chose not to. As a result, the executive's use of delegated power survives so long as future Presidents choose not to reverse it -with the Antiquities Act as well as any other administrative statute.
A. The Many Flaws of the Cummings Opinion
Much of the existing scholarship errs in relying heavily on the 1938 opinion of Attorney General Cummings. Cummings advised FDR that he lacked the authority to revoke President Coolidge's designation of the Castle Pinckney National Monument because he concluded that no power existed to revoke a prior designation. 61 Although the opinion has been cited in some later government documents 62 and by legal commentators, no court has ruled on the president's revocation power or cited the opinion, in part because no president has attempted to revoke a prior designation.
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Attorney General Cummings addressed whether the secretary of the interior could abolish the Castle Pinckney National Monument in Charleston, South Carolina, and transfer the land to the War Department. Under the Antiquities Act, President Calvin Coolidge had formed the monument in 1924 from a US fort that had existed in the Charleston harbor since the early 19th century. As Attorney General Cummings observed, the Antiquities Act contained no clear textual authorization to "abolish" national monuments. "If the President has such authority, therefore, it exists by implication." 64 Cummings concluded that without clear authorization from Congress, President Roosevelt could not reverse the designation of Castle Pinckney as a national monument. In a brief opinion, he relied on two grounds. First, he believed U.S. Attorney General Edward Bates had settled the issue in an 1862 opinion that found that the president could not return a military reservation to the pool of general public lands available for sale. Second, he compared the Antiquities Act to other federal laws governing temporary withdrawals of federal land or forests, which explicitly provide for presidential modification of past designations. In addressing past practice, which he conceded supported a right to reduce the size of national monuments, Cummings argued that "it 61 Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinkney Nat'l Monument, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185 (1938) . 62 The solicitor of interior cited the opinion in 1947 but for a different proposition, namely that the president can alter the boundaries of a national monument. See "National Monuments," Interior Decisions 60 (1947): 9. 63 The attorney general was first authorized to issue legal opinions to the president under the Judiciary Act of 1789, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § § 511-513, and to other agency heads by that act and other delegations of authority from the president. Attorney general opinions, and those that now are issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), are binding on executive branch agencies. In contrast, a president is free to disregard themespecially if he concludes that his oath to take care that the laws are faithfully executed conflicts with such an opinion. Nevertheless, prudence dictates that the president request that his own attorney general reexamine such opinion, perhaps with the assistance of OLC, which became an independent division of the DOJ in 1951 and is commissioned to provide serious legal analysis on such matters. The existence of Cummings' 1938 published opinion is an internal hurdle that any administration should address, preferably with another published opinion, either affirming, qualifying, or overruling Cummings' advice. 64 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 186.
does not follow from power so to confine that area that he has the power to abolish a monument entirely." 65 Cummings' opinion is wrong in some obvious respects and too cursory to be persuasive even if its errors were excised. One major flaw is Cummings' misreading of Attorney General Bates' opinion, 66 44 years before the enactment of the Antiquities Act. Bates' opinion discusses whether an administration in the 1840s could rescind a military reservation in Illinois for which Congress had appropriated money and on which a fort had been constructed. He found that the statute delegating to the president the power to designate land for military purposes did not include a power to withdraw the designation. Bates seemed to believe that delegated power, once used, could not be activated to reverse the decision-that the president had effectively exhausted the delegation of power. "A duty properly performed by the Executive under statutory authority has the validity and sanctity which belong to the statute itself, and, unless it be within the terms of the power conferred by that statute, the Executive can no more destroy his own authorized work, without some other legislative sanction, than any other person can." 67 But the original 1862 opinion contains many factual and legal distinctions that Cummings does not address. For example, Bates states that he is interpreting military reservation authority under "early acts of Congress" and an "act of 1809," which provided appropriations for constructing forts "for the protection of the northern and western frontiers." Perhaps most importantly, the 1862 opinion acknowledges that the military reservation itself could be abandoned by the War Department, which is the equivalent of revoking a land reservation under the Antiquities Act. It also relies on the fact that in 1858, Congress had specifically repealed any statutes that authorized the sale or transfer of military sites to the public. Of course, no such express statutory prohibition on the presidential withdrawal of national monument status exists in the Antiquities Act.
Instead, Bates focuses on whether an abandoned military reservation and its buildings would be subject to "entry or preemption by settlers." This refers to the Preemption Act of 1841, which allowed squatters on federal land during the 1840s and 1850s to secure title to it at a low price (preempting a general public sale) if they also worked it for a number of years. 68 To conclude that squatters could not simply enter the military reservation and secure title to it "by preemption," Bates relies on a combination of factors that are distinguishable from revoking a monument designation under the Antiquities Act, including: the unnamed "early acts of Congress," which authorized its initial selection as a military reservation; the 1809 appropriation for military forts on the frontier; that Fort Armstrong had been constructed and occupied for more than two decades; that its buildings were still in good order; that other laws governed the sale of abandoned military property; and more recent acts of Congress relating to the particular piece of property, which assumed it was not subject to preemption by settlers.
Cummings did not acknowledge these and other potential distinctions. Bates found that separate laws governed the management and disposal of military property from the homesteading or preemption laws that had populated Kansas and Nebraska. It is not surprising that interpreting 65 Ibid., 188. 66 Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359 (1862). 67 Ibid., 364. 68 The Homestead Act of 1862 revised this law, significantly reducing the number of "preemption" claims. But
Bates was addressing the rights of settlers who may have occupied the former military property before 1862. different statutes yields different results, but even so, Bates conceded that an improved military reservation could be abandoned and sold, just not pursuant to the Preemption Act of 1841. Cummings mistakenly read the 1862 opinion for the proposition that once land is reserved under any act of Congress, that reservation can never be rescinded.
In contrast to the question Bates addressed, revoking a monument designation under the Antiquities Act would not change the federal ownership of the land at issue. For this and other reasons, the portion of the 1862 opinion that Cummings quoted is especially questionable as applied to land reservations under the Antiquities Act. The quoted language also contains several inapt analogies and question-begging propositions of law.
For example, Cummings quotes the proposition that the "power to execute a trust, even discretionarily, by no means implies the further power to undo it when it has been completed" (emphasis supplied). The italicized phrase is misleading. Not every grant of a power to create something must include the power to abolish it, but many do. Special circumstances might make revoking certain acts impossible, or that power might be withheld, but a presumption of revocability is often implied if the grant is silent. 69 Indeed, reliance on trust law should have led to the opposite conclusion, at least under the Antiquities Act. Under general trust principles, at least in the 20th and 21st centuries, the power to create a trust includes the power to revoke it when the settlor retains an interest in it, unless the trust is expressly irrevocable under the original grant of authority. 70 If a court applied trust law principles to the Antiquities Act, we think it would conclude that the president retains an interest in the monument designations he or a predecessor creates, including that he has the duty to manage them, issue and enforce regulations to protect them, and adjust their borders from time to time with subsequent presidential proclamations. Moreover, the broader principle of trust law is that the party creating the trust has the power to decide whether it is revocable; the discretionary nature of the president's power under the Antiquities Act and certain textual cues suggest Congress did not intend to make all monument reservations permanent.
Cummings' reliance on Bates' analysis fares no better than his reliance on trust law. It is true that a president has no general constitutional authority to manage federal land, although he may have some limited powers as commander in chief or under other statutory grants of authority. That, however, does not answer whether Congress' grant of authority in "early acts of Congress" or the Antiquities Act of 1906 to make reservations includes the power to rescind or revoke them. Indeed, Bates conceded that military reservations could be abandoned; he just believed the land would not be subject to "preemption by settlers." In the context of the Antiquities Act, a president could rescind or amend the parcels of land reserved for a given monument without repealing the underlying monument designation. There is no evidence that Congress intended to withhold either revocation power in the Antiquities Act, let alone both of them.
Bates' final proposition is equally circular as applied to the Antiquities Act. He asserts that reading the unnamed "early acts of Congress" and especially the 1809 appropriation to allow "preemption by settlers" would effect a repeal of the underlying laws: "To assert such a principle is to claim for the Executive the power to repeal or alter an act of Congress at will. presidents cannot unilaterally repeal statutes does not answer whether Congress included the power both to make and revoke reservations in the original grant of authority under the Antiquities Act.
Cummings' only attempt at an original argument starts and ends with one of the Antiquities Act's purposes: "to preserve . . . objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States." Cummings then immediately concludes, in ipse dixit fashion (without making a coherent argument), that: "For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the President is without authority" to issue a proclamation revoking the Castle Pinckney National Monument.
Such casual reliance on one of the act's purposes, and one that was not set forth in the act itself, adds nothing of weight, since it does not explain why revoking the monument at issue was inconsistent with that general purpose of preserving objects of national significance. What if the president determined, for example, that no objects of national significance remained at a given site?
Cummings also does not fairly consider other purposes. If a textual ambiguity justified a resort to legislative materials, the full record would show that the act's primary purpose was to provide a power to the president to prevent the destruction and looting of artifacts until they were excavated and safeguarded or until Congress could consider long-term measures regarding the site. This more complete statement of purposes highlights that the passage of time matters and that a later president could reasonably conclude that Congress declined the opportunity to legislate on the land or objects in an earlier monument designation or that they were now safeguarded, such as by excavation and display in a museum.
B. The General Power of Reversal
A proper analysis of the revocation power under the Antiquities Act would also consider other grants of authority to the president in the Constitution and other statutes and how the courts and constitutional practice have treated them. Cummings made no effort to do that in 1938, and the range of presidential action the courts have upheld, even under older delegations dating to the post-Civil War era, is now more muscular than in early-20th-century jurisprudence.
The general principle is that the authority to execute a discretionary government power usually includes the power to revoke it-unless the original grant expressly limits the power of revocation. One particularly relevant statutory example is the executive's power to issue regulations pursuant to statutory authority. When Congress gives an agency the discretionary authority to issue regulations, it is presumed to also have the authority to repeal them. 71 This is especially true when the regulation has shown to be contrary to the purposes underlying the statute.
72 Section 4 of the Antiquities Act grants three department secretaries the power to publish "from time to time uniform rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out this Act." Although Congress did not expressly state that the officials can repeal or significantly alter their regulations once they are published "from time to time," that is presumed by law. The broader power of revocation by the president should also be strongly presumed. 71 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pa. v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 72 See ibid.
Squillace and his Virginia Law Review co-authors argue that other federal land management statutes from the turn of the 19th century expressly granted the power to reverse a land withdrawal decision, implying that the power is denied otherwise. 73 The most important flaw in their analysis is that, while some statutes seem to provide express revocation authority, they cannot point to any court decision or other controlling authority that holds that revocation authority does not exist when a statute is silent. If they were correct, almost all regulations would operate as a one-way ratchet that would prevent future administrations from modifying or repealing past rules. As we have observed, of course, courts interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act have found that statutory silence means the exact opposite. In the absence of any such holding, the preferred presumption Squillace and his colleagues falls apart, especially in light of the numerous instances we describe above and later in this section that supports a strong presumption that the power to act includes the power to revoke or modify that act.
Beyond that, the examples cited by Squillace and his co-authors are not as strong as they first seem. The Pickett Act of 1910, for example allowed the President to withdraw federal lands from settlement and reserve them for certain purposes. The statute also provides that that the withdrawal would remain in effect "until revoked by him [referring to the President] or an Act of Congress." From this, Squillace and his colleagues imply that the President lacks revocation authority in other statutes where it is not granted explicitly. Yet, the text of the Pickett Act doesn't affirmatively authorize the President to revoke a withdrawal. Instead, it assumes the power exists and merely confirms that the withdrawal remains in effect until the President exercises that reserved power. That is hardly an express grant of revocation authority, let alone reason to suspect that President doesn't have such authority when Congress is silent.
Moreover, if the Pickett Act argument were valid, the President wouldn't be the only constitutional actor unable to revoke a monument designation. The Pickett Act also specifically mentions Congress' power to revoke a withdrawal ("until revoked by . . . an Act of Congress"). There's no similar reference to Congress's revocation authority in the Antiquities Act. If silence is enough to bar the President from revoking a national monument designation, it would also mean that Congress couldn't do so either. That unavoidable implication of the argument by Squillace et al. makes it a nonstarter.
The Forest Service Organic Administration Act's language does expressly authorize the President "to modify any Executive order that has been or may hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification may reduce the area or change the boundary lines of such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order creating such reserve." For whatever reason, Congress took a belt-and-suspenders approach in the FSOA to make abundantly clear that the President can revoke forest reserves by executive order. This doesn't imply that the President is otherwise unable to reverse other executive directives. Presidents regularly revise or revoke them. The President's authority to revoke an executive order is not limited to the FSOA and other statutes that expressly authorize him to do so. Otherwise, many of President Trump's executive orders would be permanent and binding on all future Presidents.
Constitutional law axioms are even more relevant in undermining the Squillace et al. view. A basic principle of the Constitution is that a branch of government can reverse its earlier actions using the same process originally used. Thus, Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution describes 73 SBBH Research Paper, supra note __ at 58. only the process for enacting a federal law. A statute must pass through both bicameralism (approval of both Houses of Congress) and presentment (presidential approval). But the Constitution describes no process for repealing a statute. Under Squillace's logic, Congress could not repeal previous statutes because of the Constitution's silence. Since the adoption of the Constitution, however, our governmental practice is that Congress may eliminate an existing statute simply by enacting a new measure through bicameralism and presentment. While passage of an earlier law may make its repeal politically difficult, due to the need to assemble majorities in both Houses and the requirement of presidential signature, no Congress can bind future Congresses in the use of their legislative power.
This principle applies to all three branches of the federal government. This rule also applies to the Constitution as a whole. In Article V, the Constitution creates an additional process for amending its own text, which requires two-thirds approval by the House and the Senate and then the agreement of three-quarters of the states. Without this additional option in Article V, the Constitution would require the same or very similar process for its amendment as for its enactment (which would have impractically required a new constitutional convention). Reinforcing our point, the framers decided to set out explicit mechanisms for repealing part of the original constitutional text when they wanted to provide a means that did not mirror the original enacting process.
The same principle applies to the constitutional amendments themselves. The Constitution contains no provision for undoing a constitutional amendment. Instead, the nation has used constitutional amendments to repeal previous constitutional amendments. The 21st Amendment repealed Prohibition, which had been enacted by the 18th Amendment. When the Constitution is silent about a method for repeal, it is assumed that we are to use the same process as that of enactment.
The executive branch operates under the same rule. No president can bind future presidents in the use of their constitutional authorities. Presidents commonly issue executive orders reversing, modifying, or even extending the executive orders of past presidents. No court has ever questioned that authority, even when it is used to implement statutorily delegated powers. Good examples include the successive executive orders of Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama to specify how the White House would manage and review the congressionally mandated rulemaking process. 76 be anomalous for an executive directive or presidential proclamation to somehow become immune to repeal or amendment by a subsequent president.
The implied ability of Presidents to reverse earlier presidential acts applies beyond the implementation of statutory delegations of authority. Presidents can always reverse their predecessors' exercise of executive power under the Constitution. Presidents regularly add or remove executive branch officers appointed to White House committees or even the cabinet. They have created and eliminated whole offices in the Executive Office of the President. They have increased or reduced the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisions. In fact, when the Constitution deviates from this lawmaking symmetry, it explicitly does so in the text and in a manner that makes repeal easier than the first affirmative act.
The most famous example is the president's removal power. In Anglo-American constitutional history, the executive power traditionally included the power both to hire and fire subordinate executive officials. The Constitution altered that traditional appointment process. Under Article II, Section 2, the president nominates and, with the Senate's advice and consent, appoints high executive branch officers, judges, and ambassadors. The Constitution, however, does not explicitly address removing an officer, a fact central to the debate in the First Congress over whether to permit the President to fire cabinet officers. As Sai Prakash has shown, Congress accepted that the President had the constitutional authority to remove the chiefs of the first great departments. 77 The Framing generation understood the Constitution's silence to allow the President to reverse the appointment process, even without congressional consent.
In Myers v. United States,
78 the Supreme Court firmly recognized this principle. It found that the Constitution implicitly retained the traditional rule that a president could unilaterally undo an appointment without the Senate's approval. In revoking an official's commission that was issued after Senate confirmation, the president is more clearly negating a specific, deliberative, and official Senate act. By contrast, revoking a predecessor's individual monument designation does not negate anything in particular that Congress approved.
A similar dynamic applies to the Treaty Clause. Under Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, the president can make treaties subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Again, the Constitution does not explicitly set out the procedure for terminating a treaty. But as a fourjustice plurality of the Supreme Court and the U. found, the president retains the traditional executive authority to unilaterally terminate treaties.
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Presidents and Senates cannot bind future presidents to treaties, just as they cannot prevent future presidents from removing executive branch officials.
Although the power to unilaterally abrogate a treaty flows from a grant of constitutional authority to the president to manage foreign relations, Congress is also constitutionally prohibited from delegating a statutory power to the president and then micromanaging the discretion granted. 80 Thus, an attempt by Congress to prevent later presidents from using the delegated authority of the Antiquities Act to reverse an earlier monument designation would raise serious constitutional questions. Such logic would mean that Presidents could never remove a cabinet officer or terminate a treaty -indeed, their logic would imply that no one could remove an executive branch officer and treaties would be permanent.
III. A Limited Power to Revoke Certain National Monuments or Declare Others Invalid
Even if every monument designation cannot be revoked as a matter of presidential discretion, authority might still exist to abolish some designations based on an earlier factual error, changed circumstances, or an original statutory violation. In short, three determinations, two factual and one legal, may provide strong grounds for certain monument revocations or invalidations.
A. New Factual Determinations
First, if the president concludes that the original designation was mistaken, perhaps because of an archeological fraud, historical error, or improved or updated scientific analysis, the predicate for original designation would be undermined. It would be hard to argue that Congress intended that every curiosity deemed scientifically interesting to a president 100 years ago (the once popular but now discredited and racist branch of human craniology/phrenology comes to mind) forever must remain a valid source of scientific interest and protection. It might be more controversial for a president to determine that a geological monument designation thought to be rare and scientifically interesting by an earlier president is not all that worthy of protection as a monument, but limiting such reevaluation would elevate certain determinations (or privilege geological claims) over others in a manner that would be hard to logically sustain. Second, as explained above, the Antiquities Act also was intended to provide authority to preserve artifacts that might otherwise be looted. Even assuming the original designation was proper, if the relevant artifacts were excavated and removed and are now on display in a museum off-site, how can it be said that the reserved parcels are currently the "smallest areas compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected"? If any of these changes of fact or scientific interest justify revocation, then the general argument against revocation would be on shaky grounds, and discretionary revocations at will would be a more plausible interpretation of the act. A presidential determination that an original designation was illegally or inappropriately large is a special case. It may provide a sound predicate for declaring a designation to be invalid or for significantly reducing the monument's size. The president might be presented with an issue analogous to a severability determination. If there is no reasonable way to reduce a reservation's size and maintain a meaningful monument, rescinding or declaring invalidity may be more appropriate. A review of controversies over the size of national monuments highlights three distinct periods of use and abuse, the last of which contains the most breathtakingly large monument designations.
Between 1906 and 1943, most monument reservations were smaller than 5,000 acres, and many of them actually protected antiquities. Yet there also were several large monument reservations or expansions during that period, mostly for scenic or geological formations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's designation of Jackson Hole National Monument in 1943 was the catalyst for two reforms, only one of which was made permanent. Wyoming congressmen were strongly opposed to the 210,950-acre monument and reservation and secured a bill to overturn it, but President Roosevelt vetoed it. In 1950, Congress made Grand Teton National Park out of most of the land from the Jackson Hole monument and added the southern portion of the former monument to the National Elk Refuge. That law also amended the Antiquities Act, forbidding further use of it to expand or establish a national monument in Wyoming without express congressional authorization. 81 The proviso enacted in 1950 does not prohibit the president from reducing the size of the monument reservation in Wyoming. Some scholars, including Squillace and his co-authors, have suggested that this provision prohibits revocation or modification of monuments by all executive branch officials, including the president. 82 They primarily rely on a House Committee report that states that FLPMA "would specifically reserve to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act."
83
The lone snippet of an otherwise ambiguous legislative history report of one House is an especially weak thread on which to hang such a crucial argument. For one, even if the legislative history were clear regarding the President's lack of authority to revoke national monuments and represented the actual view of both Houses of Congress, it is not the law. Congress neither amended the Antiquities Act in 1976, nor change the President's authority to revoke a national monument in the text of the FLPMA.
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The FLPMA's express limitation on the secretary simply confirms the natural reading of the Antiquities Act, which grants authority to the president alone to specify the parcels of land withdrawn for any monument created pursuant to the act. It should not be read to raise doubts about the president's authority to modify or revoke national monuments. The text creates no ambiguity or inference that Congress modified the president's authority in the Antiquities Act. The opposite reading of the text is much stronger, i.e., that Congress knew how to write express limitations and that it would have listed the president if its restriction on the secretary of interior's power was intended to bind the president. The legislative history cited for the contrary view is itself ambiguous, but should not be consulted when the statutory text is clear.
Perhaps the House Report author would have liked to deny the President this power, or perhaps it was written without thinking about the President's authority, but it did not make it into the law that Congress enacted. Courts have been clear that legislative history cannot change unambiguous text and that legislative history from a later Congress is not a useful guide for legislation passed by an earlier one. Furthermore, an implied repeal of an existing statute or the President's authority under it, which is all this argument could be, is strongly disfavored. As with clear statement rules in other areas, we should expect Congress to risk a severe intrusion into the President's constitutional and statutory authority in plain and unmistakable text.
These principles sink the argument relying on the FLPMA House Report. FLPMA is clear that the limitation only applies to the Secretary, not the President. Just as the House Report cannot change the text of FLPMA, it cannot change the meaning of the Antiquities Act. Simply put, the report-even if it accurately reflected the views of the entire House of Representatives in 1976-is of no help in interpreting a statute enacted 70 years earlier.
Unfortunately, the abuses under the Antiquities Act expanded significantly after 1978, especially by Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama. Until last year, President Carter held the record for the most extensive monument reservations, with nine designations that were larger than a million acres and two larger than 10 million acres. Carter's designation of more than 56 million acres of monument reservations in Alaska on a single day led to the most recent amendment to the Antiquities Act. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted by Congress and signed by President Carter on December 2, 1980, after his election loss to Reagan and the impending loss of Democratic Party control in the Senate. 85 The ANILCA settled many longstanding issues and land disputes, and it made many Alaska-specific changes to laws governing federal land management, including requiring congressional approval for national monuments in Alaska larger than 5,000 acres. 86 Whether this congressional reaction made an impression on them or for other reasons, Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush both issued no proclamations under the Antiquities Act.
Authority of a President to Modify or Eliminate a National
Nevertheless, President Clinton broke new ground with the number of monument designations per term, 87 many of which were larger than 100,000 acres and two of which were larger than one million acres. 88 He also proclaimed a questionable new type of monument on the high seas. President George W. Bush issued fewer than half as many monument designations as Clinton, and some were relatively small. Yet, President George W. Bush made a few large monument designations, including a questionable designation along the Pacific Ocean's Marianas Trench. Several of President Obama's proclamations flew in the teeth of strong congressional opposition and undermined pending congressional legislation. For example, on December 28, 2016, he created the 1.35 million-acre Bears Ears National Monument in southern Utah and the 300,000-acre Gold Butte National Monument in Nevada. Both designations were opposed by state officials and GOP congressional leaders, including the unanimous congressional delegation from Utah, which was willing to compromise on a smaller monument in Utah that permitted reasonable public uses of the area. The protective impact of the Bears Ears National Monument is particularly dubious since it is supposed to protect isolated Native American sites. It is unclear, for example, how the agency officials will protect those sites any differently after the monument designation than they might have before.
A designation smaller than 5,000 acres may still be too large (relative to some objects being protected) or politically abusive if the designation is for a questionable purpose, for example, to interfere with congressional deliberations over a compromise land-use arrangement or to regulate fishing that is not otherwise authorized. But reservations larger than 5,000 acres merit special review out of respect for Congress' traditional authority to establish federal land policy, especially if there was no "emergency" necessitating the monument designation without congressional action or if congressional leaders had expressed serious opposition to the monument designation.
If a president makes a credible determination, based on the facts and a reasonable interpretation of the act, that some former monuments are illegally large relative to the original "object" supposedly being protected, he could declare that the initial designation was void, especially if there is no easy way to make it lawful by severing discrete parcels of land. That is distinct from his power to "revoke" those he thinks were originally lawful, and it would stem from his constitutional authority to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Even so, a president trying to insulate such a decision could invoke both his constitutional authority to declare the prior designation void and his authority under the act to revoke the designation if it were legal. If he uses both sources of authority, he could issue a proclamation to exercise his authority under the Antiquities Act.
C. Special Questions Regarding Marine Monument Designations
The Supreme Court has upheld or discussed the application of the act to the submerged lands of two different monuments along the coast and inland waterways, 94 There are two problems with the designation of marine monuments far from shore under the Antiquities Act. First, the seabed at issue is not the type that the United States could have owned or controlled in 1906, in contrast to submerged land of inland waterways, bays, and the territorial seas. The modern EEZ is not only vastly wider than the "territorial waters" of 1906 but also a qualitatively different type of property interest than the United States may have acquired or controlled in an earlier era. 96 The United States had a sovereign interest in the submerged land near its coast and its territorial waters (then three miles from the coast and now 12 miles), which justifies military and economic control; it could not have and still does not have such a sovereign interest in the area beyond its territorial waters. 97 Relatedly, even current domestic and international law permits only limited regulation or control of the marine and wind resources in the EEZ outside our territorial waters, and thus, it does not constitute the type of federal government "control" of the relevant land that is required under the Antiquities Act.
In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 98 the Fifth Circuit held that the Antiquities Act does not extend beyond the territorial sea, despite subsequent legislation authorizing federal regulation beyond it. Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the federal government's role in regulating beyond the territorial seas had expanded since 1906, including through the adoption of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 99 none of that conveyed the degree of control that the federal government enjoyed on federally owned lands or federally controlled territories in 1906. 100 When President Clinton proposed to designate the first marine monument beyond American territorial waters, he received some surprising pushback from the Departments of Interior and Commerce, which submitted a joint memorandum to the Justice Department asserting that the EEZ is not "owned or controlled by the Federal Government." The OLC ultimately disagreed but acknowledged that it was a "closer question" than earlier disputes over the president's designation authority. 101 We believe that the OLC opinion is flimsy and that the attorney general or White House counsel should request a reconsideration. The Clinton-era OLC opinion argues that the EEZ is sufficiently controlled by the federal government because recent presidents have consistently asserted some regulatory authority over the area and the United States has greater regulatory authority than any foreign government. 102 Of course, the same is true of many areas that are unquestionably not "owned or controlled by the Federal Government."
Private lands in the United States, for instance, are subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, and no other nation can claim an authority to regulate them. But this does not mean the president has the authority to unilaterally designate privately owned lands as a monument. The Antiquities Act confirms this, stating that the president can receive privately owned lands to include them in a monument, but only through the owner's voluntary relinquishment of them. 103 The OLC opinion cannot be squared with this. It also asserts that the EEZ is sufficiently controlled by the federal government because it has the authority to protect threatened or endangered species found there. 104 Yet the same could be said of any privatelyowned land under the Endangered Species Act. 105 The OLC opinion has other problems, but its main defect is the failure to effectively grapple with the federal government's limited power to regulate in the EEZ. Rather than address whether this affects the president's ability to designate a monument in this area, the opinion instead argues that the regulations imposed within the monument are limited by the customary international law that otherwise applies. However, that cannot be squared with the Antiquities Act. In 1906, land owned or controlled by the federal government described federally owned land and federal territories in which the federal government had almost no limits on its authority and could exercise its full police power. Consistent with that, the Antiquities Act requires monuments to be regulated as necessary to effectuate the statute's purposes. For these reasons, we think the OLC opinion in 2000 is erroneous.
Finally, even if the Antiquities Act does allow monument designations in international submerged lands in the United States' EEZ, such designations might be valid only for the seabed itself and for the purpose of seabed protection. If so, that would provide additional authority to revoke designations that are primarily designed to protect sea life in international waters and remove other restrictions in ocean habitat, even if they are above seabed features that might be the subject of protection. To be clear, other authority exists to regulate fishing and other activity in the oceans, but it is questionable whether the Antiquities Act provides such authority.
The act's text provides strong support for limiting monuments to landmarks and objects on the land and further limits reservations relating to such monuments to parcels "of land." In particular, the act provides authority for monument designations of only "landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the land," and when such monuments are designated, the president may then "reserve as part thereof parcels of land" for protection (emphasis supplied). There may be some ancillary power to regulate the air above a monument or some activity in the sea above a marine monument, but it is doubtful that the ocean itself and its living denizens can be designated as part of the monument. It is equally doubtful that a reservation of land can encompass the water column as a matter of presidential discretion under the Antiquities Act.
In Cappaert, the Supreme Court upheld some authority to regulate the immediate watershed outside a monument if that is necessary to protect geologic structures and endangered wildlife in the monument grounds, but its holding was based on other federal law governing reserved water rights.
106 The Court did mention the endangered fish that swim in the unmoving pool of the monument at issue, but that reference does not seem necessary to its holding that appurtenant water outside the monument was reserved. The facts of that case are distinguishable in other ways from the unbounded ocean and the unthreatened fish, mammals, and other sea creatures that swim in and out of it.
Yates v. United States, decided by the Supreme Court in 2015,
107 supports one such distinction. If a "fish" is not a "thing" within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley law because it is not like the other listed things that should be protected from shredding, 108 then it is even less likely that the ocean and its sea life are objects analogous to "structures" and "landmarks" that are "situated upon the land" within the meaning of the Antiquities Act. And even if the ocean and its sea life are "objects" that could be part of a monument, the Antiquities Act's second step permits the reservation of only the "part thereof" that are "parcels of land" necessary to protect them. Accordingly, if the ocean and its sea life cannot be designated as part of a monument, or if no reservation "of land" can include them, then their regulation must rely on some other principle of law (analogous to the federal law regarding reserved water rights) and perhaps on proof that such regulation is necessary to protect the landmark, structure, or other objects of historic or scientific interest at issue in the actual monument, such as the seamounts and underwater valleys or mountains. For these reasons, the president should be free to lift erroneous fishing restrictions that are in place solely by reason of a marine monument designation.
IV. The Power to Reduce the Scope of a Reservation Pursuant to a Monument Designation
Almost all commentators, including past opinions from the attorney general and the solicitor of interior, agree that monument boundary adjustments are permissible. 109 Environmentalists often seek large expansions of existing monuments. As a result, several presidents have added vast additional reservations to existing national monuments, including three by President Obama that added millions of acres. Many presidents have made other boundary adjustments, including some For many of the same reasons that we reject a limitation on the president's revocation power, we also question limitations on his power to substantially reduce the size of existing monument reservations. Moreover, there are additional reasons why the president has broad authority to alter the parcels of land reserved under existing monument designations, including logical inferences from textual provisions and the varied reasons prior presidents have given for boundary reductions.
One textual signal in support of boundary adjustments is that the Antiquities Act requires reservations to be "in all cases . . . confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." There is no temporal limit to this requirement. Some presidential proclamations adjusting the boundaries of existing monuments recognize a continuing duty to review and comply with this command. Even if boundary adjustments to date had all been somewhat minor, which is not the case, it is hard to read into the text a limiting principle that allows large additions but not large reductions.
Another textual hook is the discretionary nature of the president's authority under the Antiquities Act. The relevant language in Section 2 states that it is "in his discretion" whether to declare the national monument. It then states that he "may reserve as part thereof parcels of land" to protect the objects at issue (emphasis added). The parcels must, as noted above, be confined to the smallest area compatible with the protective purpose, but it is still up to the president's discretion which precise parcels to designate. Apart from reducing the overall size, the next president may determine that a given monument with a patchwork of private inholdings is better protected by concentrating the monument within the federal land that the government owns and controls. 114 There is nothing in the act that privileges the original designation and regulations over a later presidential determination.
There are more fundamental questions about how best to manage and protect federal property near national monuments with available resources. The belief that increasing federal regulation is always the best means of protecting something is more ideologically than empirically based, especially when it excludes all other options. Cooperation with state authorities and private property owners who own adjoining land can promote superior land-use decisions, including better protections for such properties. Such consultation and multiparty agreements tend to increase support for the resulting decisions and increase fundamental fairness, since some prior designations have walled in private lands and restricted the reasonable use of such private property.
The evidence surrounding many recent monument designations also suggests that some of the largest geological and scenic monuments were not motivated exclusively or even primarily by a desire to protect an "object" of historic or scientific interest as much as to lock up natural resources from development and use-regardless of how limited or temporary the surface disturbances would be. Such actions not only create economic hardship for local communities and injustice to those who may have reasonably depended on the timber, grazing, or mineral resources, but they may actually be counterproductive to the ecological and environmental interests that past presidents claimed to protect. For example, prohibiting fishing in vast grounds in the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans where fishermen have engaged in sustainable practices forces more concentrated activity in other areas that may trigger unsustainable impacts.
Such large monument reserves also contribute to an estimated $13.5 to $20 billion maintenance backlog on Department of Interior land-management responsibilities 115 -and deny the federal government any reasonable return on land-use fees and leases. A more careful accounting of federal land policy might lead a president to conclude that some vast monument reserves, under the Antiquities Act and other acts, diffuse attention and resources from higher priorities and contribute to environmental degradation, soil erosion, and other forms of mismanagement of federal property. Apart from all that, increasing public use of vast tracts of federal land should be sufficient grounds for reducing certain prior monument reservations. The facts that underlie one Supreme Court case may prove instructive in defining possible grounds for monument reductions.
In Alaska v. United States, 116 the Supreme Court affirmed its special master's recommendation regarding the federal versus state ownership of certain submerged lands underwater near Alaska's southeast coast. Some of the land in dispute was under Glacier Bay, which is now a national park. Glacier Bay was first reserved as a national monument by President Coolidge in 1925 and later enlarged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's in 1939, both pursuant to the Antiquities Act. In describing the relevant lands in question, the Court also noted that President Eisenhower "slightly altered" the monument's boundaries in 1955.
The Supreme Court accepted without discussion that the addition by Roosevelt and the "altered" boundaries by Eisenhower were valid. The monument was made part of the Glacier Bay National Park by an act of Congress in 1980, but since the status of the land in 1959 (when Alaska was made a state) was the critical focus of its analysis, the national park act was not particularly relevant to that determination. While the Court did not discuss it further, the Eisenhower proclamation reduced the size of the Glacier Bay National Monument in three ways without any land swaps or additions to counter those reductions. More importantly, the grounds Eisenhower provided for that reduction are historically interesting and legally relevant.
In Proclamation 3089 on March 31, 1955, 117 Eisenhower reduced the size of Glacier Bay National Monument for three different reasons. One ground was that some lands "including several homesteads which were patented prior to the enlargement of the monument [by Roosevelt] are suitable for a limited type of agriculture use and are no longer necessary for the proper care and management of the object of scientific interest on the lands within the monument." Although Proclamation 3089 provides no further explanation of this exclusion, it is fair to read it as concluding that the original inclusion of this land was mistaken and, perhaps as important, that the lands were no longer necessary for the proper care of the objects of scientific interest in the monument.
The second reduction in the size of Glacier Bay National Monument was based squarely on Eisenhower's conclusion that such lands should have been included in Tongass National Forest instead of the national monument in 1939, when Roosevelt enlarged it, "and such lands are suitable for national-forest purposes." Eisenhower determined that the earlier inclusion of these lands in the monument was in error, since their exclusion from the forest was "erroneous." He did not specifically declare that they were "no longer necessary" to the proper care of the objects of scientific interest in the Glacier Bay National Monument, but he must have concluded they were never necessary to be included or that the mistaken inclusion in 1939 was sufficient to exclude them in 1955.
The third reduction (the first mentioned in the proclamation) was because certain lands are "now being used as an airfield for national-defense purposes and are no longer suitable for nationalmonument purposes" (emphasis supplied). How land reserved in a national monument became a military airfield is not explained. In some respects, this may be the most interesting exclusion of all. Whether the earlier use of the land for an airfield was legal or not, Eisenhower asserted the authority to declare a higher government purpose for federal land that was part of a national monument and, by proclamation, to remove it from the national monument reservation. Note also that Eisenhower states that the airfield land was no longer suitable for inclusion in the national monument because it was an airfield, not that the land was otherwise unsuitable for inclusion in the monument. Would the same reasoning apply if it were not yet an airfield?
And while Eisenhower's total reductions in the size of Glacier Bay National Monument were not great relative to the monument's overall size, they were not trivial either. According to the National Park Service, the reductions total more than 4,100 acres of submerged land and 24,900 acres of other land. 118 Most national monuments before 1955 did not even reach 29,000 acres. Moreover, some of President Eisenhower's other monument reductions constituted a larger proportion of the original size of the monument (e.g., Great Sand Dunes), and earlier presidential reductions were even greater, as discussed above.
Attempts to argue from its perambulatory purposes that the Antiquities Act does not authorize significant reductions are as conclusory as Cummings' analysis of the revocation issue. Reasoning from selective, broad protective purposes can always yield the desired result. We reach the opposite conclusion based on the text discussed above and consideration of all the act's purposes, the original compromises the act incorporated, and separation of powers principles.
Subsequent congressional land-management statutes do not change the Antiquities Act, but they cut sharply against the policy argument that the act's use is necessary to promptly secure land that is otherwise prone to looting or harmful development. Indeed, these more recent laws provide the same or superior protection without undermining Congress' primary role in federal land-use decisions. Of special note, the secretary of interior now has statutory authority to make emergency withdrawals of federal land with few limitations (and none relating to size), including land not under his department's jurisdiction, which expire no later than three years after they are withdrawn.
119
After the authority granted in 1978, one can no longer truthfully justify the president's power to lock up land from reasonable public uses in perpetuity as an "emergency" measure to stop imminent harm, no matter how often this claim is made. Yet monument declarations do have one powerful, immediate effect: They stop or inhibit ongoing congressional debate and potential compromise over the land at issue. Congress has withdrawn many federal lands for heightened protection in specific laws that balance the interests of multiple stakeholders. Defenders of permanent, unalterable national monuments regularly implore the president to preempt or interfere with Congress' deliberations. Even so, they cannot reasonably argue that presidential authority under the act can work only in one direction and that the interest of the states and other citizens cannot be reconsidered.
If the president can revoke prior monuments altogether, there is no strong argument that he lacks a lesser power to significantly reduce the land withdrawn for one. But even if the president lacks the power to revoke a monument, past practice includes proclamations that reduced some monuments to a fraction of their current size, such as President Taft's 89 percent reduction of the Navajo Nation Monument. Moreover, we think the courts are more likely to uphold significant reductions if the president could credibly include in his determination that the original designation was inappropriately large relative to the object to be protected or has become so with changed circumstances.
It would bolster his position if the president includes any existing site-specific justifications for reducing the particular monument's land reservation. For example, a president might issue a proclamation determining that limited resources prevent proper management of the largest national monuments, that other authority now exists for the excluded parcels to be regulated and managed (including perhaps a management plan for them), that changed technology or other changed circumstances allow a smaller area to be designated to protect the objects in question, or that other changed circumstances warrant such reductions.
The president's authority to significantly reduce the size of an existing monument would be less certain if the Supreme Court or other appellate court ruled that he lacked a general discretionary authority to revoke prior monument designations. But even then, we think the president would retain the authority, if not the duty, to reduce the size of existing monuments that were unreasonably large relative to the objects being preserved-or have become illegally large with changed circumstances. And such determinations should be entitled to the same or similar respect as the original reservations.
As with a complete revocation, someone would have to establish standing to sue to overturn a proclamation reducing the size of a monument, and that might be difficult in many cases. And even if standing is established, we think the challenger would have a significant burden to prove in order to prevail. If the challenge were based on a factual determination, such a challenger might have to prove an abuse of discretion to overcome the president's more recent determinations under the act, or the courts might hold that some determinations under the act are textually committed to the president's absolute discretion (absent corruption or a procedural failure) and not subject to judicial review.
Conclusion
We have argued that the president retains a general discretionary power to revoke prior monument designations pursuant to the Antiquities Act. It is a general principle of government that the authority to execute a discretionary power includes the authority to reverse the exercise of that power. This power is at its height when prior designations were made illegally or in contravention of the act's mandate that designations be reasonable in size.
Moreover, the purpose of the act supports the president in his ability to respond to new factual determinations or changes in circumstance that require modification of a monument's boundaries. The plain language of the act, its legislative purpose, and the practice of past presidents all support this conclusion. Most importantly, it is compelled by the constitutional principle of separation of powers. If presidents choose not to protect their policies through Congress' bicameral process, they leave those policies vulnerable to their successors by constitutional design.
